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KAPLAN AND WITTGENSTEIN: 
ATHEISM, PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE 
 
Michael T. Miller* 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The attempts of Mordecai Kaplan and Ludwig Wittgenstein at reforming Jewish 
theology and analytic philosophy respectively share some important traits. While Kaplan’s 
scientifically respectable “atheistic” Judaism sought to reinterpret theological principles in line with a 
modern-day materialist vision of the cosmos, Wittgenstein’s reductionist anti-metaphysical philosophy 
attempted to show that language often leads thought astray by concealing unjustified presuppositions. 
Both thinkers were involved in a process of cleaning language – of removing terms from common use 
in order to refine, redefine, and strip away layers of misleading mythology so that they can be 
returned, purified, to everyday use. This paper will examine their thought side by side in order to 
demonstrate the similarities between their thought as well as what they can teach us about the role of 
metaphysics in deconstructing the theism-atheism binary. I will argue that there is a current of 
immanence which unites their efforts, flattening the world into a phenomenal-experiential plane 
where religious terminology is still retained as crucial for the exercise of meaningful human life but is 
understood to relate to the immediate lived experience. As a result of this de-ontologising, religion 





This paper will offer a comparison of the philosophical outlooks, particularly with regard 
to metaphysics and language, of two important twentieth-century thinkers, the legacy of 
whom has, if anything, grown since their passing. I will suggest that in examining Kaplan 
and Wittgenstein side by side we find grounds for problematizing the concept of a 
simplistic atheism-theism binary, something which itself requires a specific metaphysical 
outlook. But to begin with, we might want to ask why these two would be thought of in the 
same sentence at all? 
Mordecai Kaplan, the founder of Reconstructionism (born in Lithuania, lived most of 
his life in America, 1881-1983), and analytic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (born in 
Austria but lived most of his life in England, 1889-1951) lived at roughly the same time 
and were both attempting to navigate the currents of modernism in the milieu of the 
early-twentieth century. Both were in some sense Jewish: Kaplan, the son of a rabbi, 
himself underwent rabbinic training (at the Jewish Theological Seminary) and ordination, 
although he quickly became dissatisfied with the intellectual outlook of the Orthodox 
rabbinate and began to devise a new approach to scripture and practice, one which 
integrated the scientific knowledge and social developments which were a part of his 
world. Wittgenstein was born into a Christian family, but three of his four grandparents 
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had been Jewish. While religious matters concerned him deeply, 1 he had no explicit 
Jewish influence on his upbringing and his interest in the Bible was focussed on the New 
Testament. However, his own self-perception was that he was a Hebrew and a part of the 
Jewish people. 2  More importantly, both were strictly anti-metaphysical thinkers: 
throughout his philosophical work, Wittgenstein argued that we are led astray by a literal 
conception of language, picturing language as something like a trap with all kinds of 
metaphysical implications ready to skewer us;3 and Kaplan desired to reconstruct Jewish 
religion away from its old metaphysical assumptions towards a new doctrine which was 
pragmatic and grounded in practise. For both thinkers, their work was part of a 
philosophy of life, and so, when Wittgenstein claimed that the “meaning of the world,” 
something that lies outside of the factual boundaries of the world, may be given the name 
“God,”4 this sounds very similar to Kaplan’s belief that “God” should be a term that 
articulates our fundamental goals and values.5 For each thinker the word does not point to 
an object, but is a principle that the human finds above and beyond material facts.  
So there is a basic similarity in their projects, despite the fact that neither seems to have 
been aware of the other’s existence.6 In this paper I will argue that this similarity goes 
deeper than mere surface forms, and that there is a rigorous philosophical outlook which 
unites them, although it is often expressed in different ways. Placing these two thinkers 
side by side will help to demonstrate their similarity, and it may also help us to understand 
each one of them better. 
Specifically, what I will attempt to show is that there is a crucial phenomenological 
aspect to both Kaplan and Wittgenstein’s thought; they share a fundamental emphasis on 
subjective human life as the ground from which we must begin thinking, and with regard 
to which all conclusions should be oriented.7 Kaplan and Wittgenstein are not trying to 
describe an objective reality, but are thinking from within the world of the individual 
human experience. In fact, I will argue, they see the pursuit of ontology as something of 
an error. This then leads to the perception (and in Kaplan’s case the accusation8) of them 
                                                 
1 The last two or three decades have witnessed an increasing flow of texts on the religious in Wittgenstein’s 
thought. 
2 On Wittgenstein’s heritage and relationship with Judaism, see Ranjit Chatterjee, Wittgenstein and Judaism: A 
Triumph of Concealment (New York: Peter Lang, 2005). 
3 “We are engaged in a struggle with language.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 11. 
4 “The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, note, 11 June 1916, 
Notebooks 1914-16, ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961), 73. 
5 E.g., “God and life are one and the same.” Mordecai M. Kaplan, Questions Jews Ask: Reconstructionist Answers (New 
York: The Reconstructionist Press, 1956), 102; God means “the power manifest in the spiritual aspirations of Israel 
as making for human self-fulfilment.” Mordecai M. Kaplan, note, 30 August 1929, in Communings of the Spirit: The 
Journals of Mordecai M. Kaplan Volume I, 1913-1934, ed. Mel Scult (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001), 359. 
Cf., his remark that many people “are alienated because we do not engage frankly in the task of putting new content 
into the term God” (Kaplan, journal entry 29 January 1935, quoted in Mel Scult, The Radical American Judaism of 
Mordecai Kaplan (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press: 2013), 113), and Wittgenstein’s remark that 
“Sometimes an expression has to be withdrawn from usage and sent for cleaning, - then it can be put back into 
circulation.” Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 39. 
6 There is no recorded mention by either of the other one. Kaplan refers several times to Wittgenstein’s early 
mentor at Cambridge, Bertrand Russell – though not in terms entirely approving; e.g. in Mordecai M. Kaplan, The 
Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994), 27.  
7 As Martin Stokhof writes, “Our experience as humans, both of the world and of ourselves, is the starting and 
end point of almost all of Wittgenstein’s investigations.” Martin Stokhof, World and Life as One. Ethics and Ontology in 
Wittgenstein’s Early Thought (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002), 2. 
8 Certainly for many years Wittgenstein was unquestioningly considered an atheist; within the community of 
scholars interested in his work outside of purely analytic matters there is now more nuance. While this paper is 
dedicated to problematizing the idea and meaning of atheism, it is worth noting that several commentators have 




embracing atheism, since they are dogmatically rejecting any claim of the existence of God 
as such; but for both thinkers, religious truth and divinity still do happen as realities of 
human life, as events within the human world, and as such are important aspects of life 
which should be taken into account in order to live correctly – which is to say healthily, or 
“ethically” in the broad sense.  
I will begin with a short discussion of how religion functions in their thought, as a 
fundamentally anthropocentric activity; this will lay the ground for a deeper investigation 
of the meaning of this anthropocentrism within their philosophies, and how this informs 
their metaphysics, such that both have often been considered to be atheists – I term this 
their immanence – and finally, the implications of this immanent metaphysics for theology 
(or atheology if one prefers) will be unpacked. 
 
 
The Anthropocentric Nature of Religion 
 
For the pragmatist Kaplan, the essence of religion is not a body of dogma but a practice – 
it is a doing. It is only in the living and performing of a religion that one can discover its 
meaning, and this meaning is found through the concrete effects which the practitioner 
experiences. In the practice of religion, we experience that which we call God, and this 
experience is more meaningful than any theological theory. So, “God must not merely be 
held as an idea; He must be felt as a presence if we want not only to know about God but 
to know God.”9 The attempt to find theoretical knowledge of God is like a category error: 
the important part of religion is how it affects our living, and makes us feel valued and 
connected to society and the cosmos. For Kaplan it is the human end, the struggle for 
identity and salvation as they are experienced in our lives, which is of ultimate value, 
rather than the abstract physical process which leads to it. While Kaplan identifies the 
term “God” with those structures in the cosmos which make it possible for human beings 
to live meaningful lives, to seek and attain salvation, it is not the processes themselves 
which are important but how human beings utilise them. This is to say that the mechanical 
physical systems which scientifically undergird the events in human life are irrelevant to 
the actual living of that life; they offer us nothing. Explanations are, in this sense, useless 
even when correct. 
For Wittgenstein too,10 religious rites have to be understood in terms of their practice. 
In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, 11  he criticises Frazer for positing historical 
explanations, or even pseudo-scientific theories, behind performances; rather for him, it is 
the human experience of doing them which explains their existence; it is the effect they 
have on their participants. While the subject of Frazer’s text is primitive religion, for 
                                                                                                                           
explicitly rejected any such claim in Wittgenstein’s regard. In this case the (misplaced) accusation is rather that he 
was a theist. See for example Cyril Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
9 Kaplan, Meaning of God, 244. 
10 “Our experience as humans, both of the world and of ourselves, is the starting and end point of almost all of 
Wittgenstein’s investigations.” Stokhof, World and Life as One, 2. 
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, trans. A.C. Miles and R. Rhees (Herefordshire: Brynmill, 
1979). This text, like many of Wittgenstein’s posthumously published works, is a collection of notes, here taken from 
his annotated copy of J. G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough. While trying to ascertain a mature philosophy from scribbled 
musings and marginal notes is not recommended, these fragments do fit very well with the implications of his more 
developed and polished output. 




Wittgenstein the implications are undoubtedly applicable to all expressions of religious 
thought and practice, and so drawing the parallel with more familiar thinkers, he asks, 
“Was Augustine mistaken, when he called on God on every page of the Confessions? […] if 
he was not then the Buddhist holyman, or some other surely was. But none of them was 
making a mistake except where he was putting forward a theory.” 12 Modern religion 
should likewise be understood not as a doctrine about the world, but as an ethical 
approach to it, and that is to say it is a matter of living rather than thinking. If it is not a 
theory about the world which provokes religious behaviour, what might it be? The answer 
is in the experience of the rites themselves: “What strikes us [in rituals] as terrible, 
impressive, horrible, tragic, etc., […] that is what gave birth to them.”13 
It is important to remember that, whenever we want to investigate how things are for 
humans, the world in itself as an object of investigation is never enough – and this is 
because human concepts are formed at the interface of the objective world and 
consciousness. Consciousness as such will always manipulate and translate the raw data, in 
terms both integral to consciousness, and those based upon previous experience and 
culture; which is to say that consciousness is primed or rewired by experience. And so as 
Alan Keightley puts it,  
 
“Our particular rules of grammar reflect the style of human life and the ‘facts of nature’ as we 
find them. The essential point is that the facts alone do not account for the concepts we have. 
Indeed, what we have come to regard as ‘the facts’ is dependent upon the techniques, ways of 
speaking, etc., which have made our life what it is.”14 
 
While the concept of measurement or length is not arbitrary, that 12” = 1’ is, as it is 
determined by our culture and our intellectual history (which themselves present such 
things to us as facts). The arbitrariness of grammar must always be tempered by knowing 
that we do not and cannot choose what structures we find imposed upon us by this 
combination of world, human nature, and experience. Thus “A whole mythology is 
deposited in our language.”15 
While this mythology can tell us little about an objective reality, it can tell us much 
about our culture, and how our intellectual world is constructed. Wittgenstein describes 
certain presumptions, things like “the earth exists,” which we take as sureties of thought; 
and according to Wittgenstein, “Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for 
unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. (Every human being 
has parents.)”16 These presumptions are not unquestionable, but help to form the basic 
terms in which we think. We do not even notice them being there, they are not consciously 
held at every stage but they help form the rules we think by. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer, 1-3 
13 Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer, 3 
14 Alan Keightley, Wittgenstein, Grammar and God (London: Epworth Press, 1976), 45. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, new edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 230. 
15 Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer, 35. 
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M.Anscombe and G.H.von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), 211. 





Immanence in Kaplan and Wittgenstein 
 
Wittgenstein’s idea that the meaning of religious rites is present immediately within the 
performance of the rites themselves is part of the same agenda which holds the meaning of 
language to be in its use. He never seeks to explain religious belief, because his philosophy 
necessitates that once the facts are laid out in perspicuous arrangement, their order and 
meaning is immediately apparent; there is no concealed explanatory layer to reality which 
we have to discover through complex analysis.17 In the Tractatus, language correctly-used 
can perfectly describe the world, and if we can describe accurately, then we have done all 
the explaining we can do: the structure is open to see, and is shown in a way that other 
words can never do. This is basically to say that it is not possible to rephrase propositions 
in a clearer way than the logically correct form – this itself perspicuously demonstrates 
meaning because of the isomorphism between words and objects. In other words, meaning 
is immanent in the facts. 
While the linguistic theory of the Investigations is more complex, such that language use 
must be understood as part of a language-game,18 we still find the same basic argument in 
Wittgenstein’s contention that a word’s meaning is determined by how it is used; that is to 
say, is found in its grammar rather than in some ghostly aura hanging over it. So, when 
examining the meaning of the word “imagination,” “One ought to ask, not what images 
are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word ‘imagination’ is 
used.”19 In such cases, we are getting as close as is possible to the true nature of the word, 
because “Essence is expressed by grammar”20 and “grammar tells what kind of object 
                                                 
17 Because, correctly practised, “philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything.” Wittgenstein, Investigations, §126. 
18 The later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on language games and Forms of Life is part of a concern with multiplicity, 
an outright rejection of his earlier assumption that there is a single thing, object-nature, which determines the world 
and experience. Rather, logic is a particular and is embedded in various forms in different language games, each of 
which sets their own rules for its use. It is language which masks quite how different the internal logics are: “We 
remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our 
language makes everything alike” (Wittgenstein, Investigations, 224). While commentators such as Tim Labron, 
Wittgenstein and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009) are correct that Wittgenstein’s later work marks a significant 
shift towards a less firm and more multifaceted  conception of language, there is no change in the strict immanence 
with which he viewed meaning: the same refusal of a significant intellectual strata, or a set of rules separate from 
things as they are, is present already in the Tractatus. In fact the shift is from Wittgenstein’s belief in subsistent 
objects as the substance of the world (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §2.021), and which are therefore defined inter-
subjectively regardless of specific community, to the belief in multiple grammatical structures which emerge within 
specific contexts and determine the usage of words independently of each other. In each specific language-game, 
however, words function in exactly the same way as do objects in the form of the world in the Tractatus; while in the 
latter the possibilities of objects’ placement into states of affairs is determined by the objects’ own properties, in the 
former the object-words’ natures are determined by their location in states of affairs (language-games); and so just as 
in terms of beliefs, “What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast 
by what lies around it” (Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 144), so objects/words and the system they constitutively exist in 
are fully determinative of each other. All this is to say, that all we can know about the facts and their determination is 
present perspicuously within the facts and the elements that constitute them. Cf, “If I know an object I also know all 
its possible occurrences in states of affairs” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §2.0123); “Every one of these possibilities must 
be part of the nature of the object.” (ibid., §2.0121); “The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of 
an object.” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §2.0141) and “Essence is expressed by grammar” (Wittgenstein, Investigations, 
§371), “grammar tells what kind of object anything is” (ibid., §373), “the place of a word in grammar is its meaning.” 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkley: University of California Press, 
2005), 59.  
19 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §370. He adds, “But that does not mean that I want to talk only about the word.”  
20 Ibid., §371. 




anything is.”21 There is nothing outside of language which determines meaning; meaning 
does not match up with any “objective” qualities – or even objects – rather all it does is 
delineate how our concepts work in practice.22 Grammar itself is never justified and cannot 
be explained with reference to external realities, and so in some sense is arbitrary; but 
really it merely gives expression to some principles of our experience, of our reason and 
judgements. All we can do with respect to the “rules” of grammar is describe how 
grammar works, what role particular kinds of words play. A further corollary could be 
found in the systematisation of another branch of human involvement with the world: is it 
correct to claim that there are only three primary colours? It would be entirely 
meaningless to talk about a sense-independent justification for the categorisation of 
colours, because for one thing colours occur only via sense, and for another any method of 
breaking up the frequency spectrum is completely arbitrary. Even though there are 
indeed physical structures which cause the experience of colour and different variations in 
colour, their categorisation is entirely within the realm of human social discourse. Here, 
phenomena and language are totally intertwined. 
If the facts themselves are the full expression of meaning, if meaning occurs completely 
within the event of the facts (whether these are linguistic or material events), then we can 
do nothing except clearly state things as they are and examine this arrangement of 
elements for their sense. There is no deeper strata which controls the process of 
signification, nor a concealed key which we must find and use to open up the meaning; 
everything is discoverable from the surface form; there is nothing but the surface form. 
Just as to say that “the work of art does not convey something else, just itself,”23 whereby 
there is no intention behind the work for which it was created, rather the work itself is the 
only satisfactory explanation of its meaning. Also “[a] picture cannot […] depict its pictorial 
form; it displays it,”24 meaning that the form or essence of a picture does not exist behind 
it, represented by the picture, but rather exists in the picture, being displayed as the 
picture itself. Art is not symbolic, it does not point outside itself. If there is a meaning, then 
the work of art or picture must be the best way of expressing that meaning; we cannot find 
it outside of the work, or describe it more accurately in any other way.25 And in the same 
way, Kaplan argues that what is of value in the practice of religion is not something which 
we can get to by going around religious practice; we get to it in the most effective way 
through religion.  
A similar stripping away of metaphysics is exhibited by Kaplan, who identified God with 
the processes in the world which provide the possibility of individual human salvation, of 
identity and of living a meaningful life. Like Wittgenstein, he argued that we can be 
trapped by a particular usage of the word “God” which is no longer sensible to us. So, 
                                                 
21 Ibid., §373. Pointedly, he adds to this sentence the bracketed equation: “(Theology as grammar).” 
22 Alan Keightley, Wittgenstein, Grammar and God (London: Epworth Press, 1976) writes that, “When Wittgenstein 
says that ‘grammar tells what kind of object anything is’, he is not concerned to relate the physical features of an 
object. The grammar of ‘chair’ establishes the concept of a chair in our whole system of concepts” (43). What we are 
investigating here is the subsistent object-names which are the substance of the phenomenal world we inhabit; the 
substances of thought. “Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 162. 
23 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 58. 
24 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §2.172. 
25 “An explanation is internal to a particular language game. There is no explanation that rises above our language-
games, and explains them.” Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? ed. Peter Winch (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), 24. 




rather than platitudes like “God is love,” Kaplan suggested we rethink theology in terms of 
“love is God,” 26  removing the anthropomorphic subject and focussing instead on 
predicates. Kaplan himself saw this in Maimonidean terms of trying to not discuss the 
unfathomable essence of God – a tactic which might then lead us to a quite base 
materialism – but instead focussing on what we do know: the attributes. God, then, is 
known as immanent in the world, and is directly experienced in human life. In fact 
Kaplan thinks of the teaching he is critiquing as a form of idolatry, which he defines as a 
most human tendency to transform simple ephemeral processes into permanent objective 
things. It is objectification, or as Kaplan’s neologism has it, to “thingify”; a practice 
peculiarly continued by theologians, as “Only theologians have a tendency to bring into 
the field of mature thought the tendency of the immature mind to reify, or thingify, 
processes, relations and events as though they were identifiable entities.”27 
At another point Wittgenstein argues that a ritual action like burning an effigy is similar 
in nature to kissing a loved one’s picture; it is the very performance which explains itself. 
There is no theory behind it, no intellectual aspect beyond the desire and the concomitant 
feeling of satisfaction. And, 
 
“This is obviously not based on a belief that it will have a definite effect on the object which the 
picture represents. It aims at some satisfaction and it achieves it. Or rather, it does not aim at 
anything; we act in this way and then feel satisfied.”28  
 
Kaplan likewise explicates the practice of Jewish festivals in terms of their direct relevance 
to contemporary religious life: not their past but their effect is their justification.29 The 
ritual and the effect it has on the participants explain its use perfectly. Kaplan expresses 
the subjective value of religious experience, claiming that “no religious experience is 
genuine without elements of awe and mystery, provided they do not lead to occultism and 
supernaturalism,” and that the experience should necessarily confound our rationality such 
that we do not look beyond it for explanation: “No religious experience is possible without 
an overwhelming awareness of reality as baffling man’s power of comprehension.” 30 
However, Mel Scult concludes that while “Kaplan confronts the mystery as does any 
sensitive religious thinker, [still] he never moves beyond the mystery, never posits a 
supernatural self, never posits a meaning beyond the mystery as Heschel does.”31 Kaplan, 
                                                 
26 “If instead of affirming that God is love, spirit, etc. there were a new religion to proclaim that love is God, that 
spirit, courage, devotion, etc. are all but aspects of the love that is God, we might have a religion that is in accord 
with reality as man now knows it to be. Only when the term God will come to have an adjectival force instead of 
being a substantive, will it exercise a wholesome effect upon human life.” Kaplan, journal entry 3 September 1922, 
quoted in Scult, Radical American Judaism, 135. 
27 “Soterics,” unpublished manuscript, Reconstructionist Rabbinical College Archives, 41, quoted in Mel Scult, The 
Radical American Judaism of Mordecai Kaplan (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press: 2013), 119. 
28 Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer, 4. Clack argues that “the language of religion (the articulation of religious 
beliefs) is an extension of certain primitive reactions, say a natural expression of wonder or of fear. Note, however, 
that the religious belief is not equivalent to that expression of wonder (the expressivist view).” Brian R. Clack, 
Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), 85. Therefore, “it is inconceivable that an 
elaborately worked-out doctrinal system could come into existence without the initial, affective, primitive reactions 
he emphasizes” (86).  
29 “[W]e may define [religious ceremony] as the conventional sign language of social relations. The main purpose 
of ceremonial is to give effective, dramatic and abbreviated expression to the various emotions that center about 
social relations such as deference, regard, fellowship.” (Kaplan, note, 26 February 1914, Communings, 68) 
30 Mordecai M. Kaplan, The Future of the American Jew (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 198. 
31 Scult, The Radical American Judaism, 131. 




like Wittgenstein, remains at the crucial phenomenal intersection. For them both, it is the 
experience which is most important, not any speculation as to its effective cause or 
spiritual relevance. 
And so it seems that religion is not a metaphorical description of some truth, but a pre-
rational, and therefore pre-linguistic, activity. The religious then cannot be adequately 
formulated or expressed in any way: it cannot be said, it can only be shown by its use.32 
That it does not describe facts about the world means that it also cannot be a metaphor for 
facts about the world. To attempt to explain religious behaviour by reference to states-of-
affairs (including mental beliefs) is fundamentally flawed. The reason religious rites are 
practised is not some event thousands of years ago which they commemorate, but it is 
apparent in the very practicing of the rites.  
All this is part of the anti-depth project which is at the root of both their philosophies. 
Language does not express thoughts which exist regardless of it; and religion is not a 
theoretical approach to the world, expressing something which exists regardless of 
humanity.33 Reality rather is a flat plane, metaphysically immediate and with no concealed 
aspect either above or below it; the truth and the meaning of reality are here present 
within our very experience of them.34 
 
 
The Transcendence that Shines through Immanence 
 
In the previous sections I argued that Wittgenstein and Kaplan hold the meaning of 
reality, where reality is the experiential plane we exist in, to be entirely immanent, 
explained in and by itself. However, this is not the whole story, because while reality must 
be understood immanently there is a process which happens through this understanding, 
suggestive of another aspect; prompting the possibility that the immanent universe can 
itself express something greater than what merely is. 
Wittgenstein was firm in asserting that there is no such thing as the self; but all this 
means is that the word “I” does not refer to an object in the world. 
 
“The I enters into philosophy by the fact that ‘the world is my world’. The philosophical I is not 
man, not the human body, or the human soul with which psychology is concerned [i.e. the 
composite soul], but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of the world.”35 
                                                 
32 “[A] simile must be a simile of something. And if I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to 
drop the simile and describe the facts without it.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, “A Lecture on Ethics (1930)” Philosophical 
Review 74 (1965): 3-12 (10). Brian Clack argues that “the question is not one of the discourse of religion being either 
descriptive or non-descriptive, but of what one calls ‘description’ in the religious context.” (Clack, Wittgenstein, Frazer 
and Religion, 49) Just as ‘truth’ may mean one thing in one context and something entirely different in another, 
meaning that we cannot construct a single general theory of how propositions can mean what they mean, so we 
cannot argue that any proposition must fit a single method of description.  
33 So religious action is not a theoretical approach to the world. Religion does not express existing mind-states or 
beliefs about reality, but if anything, is the realisation of mind-states. 
34 In arguing this way, Kaplan and Wittgenstein are refuting the kind of dualism which envisions the mind as an 
isolated ghost within the shell of the body, slowly learning how to communicate across the spatial and epistemic gulf 
that bodies create. Instead, for these two thinkers, our mind or spirit happens through our bodies and our words; we 
are diaphanous, transparent to others by our actions except when we deliberately attempt to conceal ourselves. In 
this case the self is realised via action and we are the sum of our behaviours. It is our public behaviour and 
interaction which constitutes us; not some evasive gaseous thing lurking inside us. 
35 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.641 





And so, “The thinking, representing, subject does not exist.” 36  There is no bearer of 
experiences and qualities. There is no substance in which they inhere.37 What we call the 
substance is just the metaphysical unity of these things, it is nothing but their cohesion, 
their correlation together into a patterned or structured relation; as a “state of affairs.”38 
And this relation is never physically real, always teetering on the brink of destruction 
merely by the reordering of its constitutive elements (for example, in death). 
The same conclusions which Wittgenstein reaches regarding self-identity are reached 
by Kaplan for Divine identity. He writes that, “to me, God [is] not a being, but Reality 
viewed as an ordered universe […] God [is] as much more than an idea as the ego is more 
than an idea representing the sum of psychic forces in the individual.”39 Relating this to 
the already-mentioned conception of predicate-theology, he (much later) wrote, “there is 
no independent entity or substance called fire. The predicate ‘burns’ names the process 
which takes place when we see fire. Likewise when we say God loves, forgives, acts justly, 
we should understand it to mean that the process of loving, forgiving, and acting justly are 
divine.”40 While Wittgenstein talks of the humiliation of appearing as an empty tube 
inflated by a soul,41 Kaplan emphasises the divine not as a being which communicates to us 
through life, but as a process which is realised in the world and in our own actions. 
Furthermore, the tendency to reify the Divine is precisely what leads us away from its 
reality as a process, reducing it to an objectified parody: “I regard the notion of being or 
of substance as due to an intrinsic limitation of the human mind, in that it has to freeze a 
                                                 
36 Ibid., §5.631  
37  “If you talk about essence – you are merely noting a convention.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), 23; 
cf. Investigations, §92, §371, passim., and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, 
trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) §444).  
38 “[A] composite soul would not be a soul anymore.” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.5421) There is no worldly 
“subject” thing; there is nothing but the elements which constitute the subject. The unity of these is outside the 
world (it is metaphysical). Stokhof writes, “a subject does not consist of a separate entity over and above the gamut of 
thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and so forth that it contains” (Stokhof, World and Life as One, 193) and relates this 
to set theory, that “The relation between a set and its elements in set theory may provide a partial model.” (Ibid., 
293, note 11) This is according to the interpretation of the early Wittgenstein as adapting Schopenhauer’s will, with 
a logical structure replacing the epistemological representation. It is important to remember that will does not alter 
the facts of the world. Will is the attitude of the subject and is an ethical component, but not the instigator of actions 
(and therefore not a dictator of facts in the world). It is ethical in its relation to what we wish to bring about, we can 
talk of a pure or corrupt will. It is not ethics in the usual sense of specific actions, but rather our ethical intention in 
the kind of world we wish to see, and how we connect facts into a whole. This absolute criterion integrates specific 
actions and events into a larger whole; this integration is ineffable. Any describability implies a connection with 
contingency, which is all that language can tackle; but the ethical must be concerned with the absolute. 
Ergo, to be happy, or live a happy life, is to be in harmony with the world (and the will which transcends it, 
“upon which I depend”); regardless of the particular manifestation of states of affairs, which are accidental and 
unaffected by my will anyway; one must accept the world as it is. The human is impotent, cannot impose their will 
upon the world (and this is certainly a part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy which is based on his own experience; in his 
notebooks he once remarked “I cannot steer the happenings of the world according to my will: am entirely 
powerless. I can only make myself independent of the world – and thus, in a certain sense, master it – only in so far 
as I renounce any influence over its happenings.” (Wittgenstein, note, 11 June 1916, Notebooks, 73). Although we do 
not know what he was referring to here, it seems as if he felt it keenly enough to integrate and address it in his 
philosophy). 
Thus, “The facts are all just part of the problem, not of the solution.” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.4321). The 
solution must be outside, must transcend contingency. The transcendence of ethics is related to the inability to 
express ethics meaningfully in language (see Wittgenstein, Lecture on Ethics, 15). 
39 Kaplan, note, 13 October 1922, Communings, 169. 
40 Kaplan, journal entry 6 November 1952 (quoted in Scult, Radical American Judaism, 135). 
41 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 11. 




segment of an ongoing process or becoming in order to think about it.” This freezing is 
done through the use of nouns or substantives; “These substantives lead the mind to reify 
the segments, when they are objects and to personify them when they are mental 
constructs. Among the mental constructs are the notions of the human person, or soul and 
God.”42 Kaplan’s God is no longer a metaphysical proposition separate from real life, 
performing miracles to gain our attention, but is part of the machinery of reality which 
correctly has its final expression in human consciousness. He argues that any modern 
“disconnectedness” from religious rites is because we make an error in expectation: “in 
past ages […] this particular complaint that the individual could not experience God in the 
worship of the synagogue was unheard of.”43 It is a misunderstanding of both religions’ 
function and its prior integration into everyday life. Just as for Wittgenstein, we know 
someone is in pain when we see them cradling a limb and whimpering,44 for Kaplan we 
fully know God in the living of a religious life. Wittgenstein is similarly scathing about the 
problem of ‘other minds’: “Do I believe in a soul in someone else, when I look into his eyes 
with astonishment and delight?”45 To posit such philosophical questions is to deliberately 
lose touch with the immediacy with which truth is present to us in life. Like the 
Wittgensteinian I, the Kaplanian God is completely integrated into the world, not 
concealed from the physical but revealed by it; as it.46 
Kaplan claims that the important distinction is not between the atheist and the theist, 
but between those who perceive meaning and order in the world, and those who do not. 
Wittgenstein believes also that if there is a difference between the world of the believer and 
that of the atheist, it is mostly in how each connects the same brute facts. In his notebooks 
he mused that if anything could convince one to believe in God, it is an upbringing which 
indoctrinates one to sense a tendency in life toward order.47 
If language (religious or not) does not describe facts about the world but demonstrates 
the framework of our understanding, then metaphysical statements, which might be 
mistakenly taken as describing non-material states of affairs (whatever that might mean), 
are not actually “factual” at all. They define how we interpret. In the famous duck-rabbit 
drawing,48 no facts about the picture change when our perception shifts from one to the 
other interpretation. Yet in a holistic sense, what we see is completely different. Because 
the elements have been given a new context (the shape of a rabbit, or of a duck), their 
relationship to one another, and the subject’s relationship to the whole, has become 
entirely different. And it is the same with religious language: For both Wittgenstein and 
Kaplan, to place a religious interpretation onto life makes no change or addition to the 
elements which constitute reality; it does not posit the existence of some supernatural being. 
Rather, it rearranges the elements of life in such a way that a new meaning emerges, and a 
                                                 
42 Kaplan, journal entry 2 April 1954 , quoted in Scult, Radical American Judaism, 137. 
43 Kaplan, Meaning of God, 263-4.  
44 Wittgenstein, Investigations, §244-250. 
45 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), 268. 
46 So just as “the place of a word in grammar is its meaning.” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, 59) for 
Wittgenstein, so the place of a human in the world determines their life with meaning; we cannot abstract (to do so is 
a metaphysical error). 
47 “Convincing someone of God’s existence is something you might do by means of a certain upbringing, shaping his 
life in such and such a way. Life can educate you to ‘believing in God.’” Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 86. 
48 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 194.  




new kind of relationship is possible. It localises the believer within a context of universal 
direction, whereby ‘salvation’ is possible. However, 
 
“This should not be interpreted as implying that the belief in God is purely subjective, a 
figment of the imagination rather than an interpretation of reality. One might as well say that, 
since the awareness of colour is a subjective experience, it is entirely a creation of the eye, and 
that no objective reality is responsible for the eye experiencing colour.”49  
 
This is to say that just because it is an interpretation, it does not make it subservient to any 
other interpretation. In a sense this is the same argument as was famously made by 
Husserl,50 that looking behind appearances and trying to remove the subjective human 
element from our interpretations is in fact smuggling ever more human speculation into 
the thought – experience is direct, but positing a reality behind the experience, one devoid 
of interpretation, is necessarily a speculative endeavour.  
On the other hand, to suppose that there is no reality behind the perception, risks 
another kind of intellectual reductionism. Kaplan insists that there is something real in the 
world which our God-idea represents and is caused by, even if that something is not 
formally identical with the idea.51 There is after all something objective in the structure of 
the cosmos to which the aspirations of humanity, our wish for salvation and fulfilment, are 
related – in other words the possibility of these is part of the structure of reality – which 
means that the divine, when associated with these, is still something transcendent of those 
impulses in humanity themselves. The possibility would be meaningless without humans to 
enact that possibility, so it is only valid in relation to us, and yet it transcends us and exists 
above and beyond us, regardless of what we do with it (and in fact even whether we exist 
or not) – that structure is in place in the world out there, and was before we existed and 
were able to take advantage of it, although it only becomes useful once we are able to use 
it; in conjunction with us. “The basic spiritual need of our day is to learn to conceive God 
as manifesting himself both in human nature and in the cosmos of which we are a part, 
that is, as immanent and transcendent.”52 For Kaplan this is precisely the unity of all the 
elements of the universe in which we should have faith, the wholeness; “the very 
conception of objective reality as cosmos or order, or as a universe in which there obtains 
absolute uniformity of natural law and complete interaction of all its parts is what we 
should mean by transcendent and cosmic support.”53 The “transcendent correlative to 
man’s will to salvation” that Kaplan experiences “with the same immediacy as I do my own 
                                                 
49 Kaplan, Meaning of God, 306. Cf. the work of evolutionary biologists establishing that colour in plants evolved 
alongside the evolution of sight in animals – its raison d’etre being to attract or communicate something to animals, 
in the hope of manipulating their behaviour in favour of, e.g., consuming fruit and distributing seeds. See, e.g., 
Mary F. Willson and Christopher J. Whelan, “The Evolution of Fruit Color in Fleshy-Fruited Plants,” The American 
Naturalist 136.6 (1990): 790-809. Kaplan was of course no stranger to evolutionary theory, as discussed in Daniel R. 
Langton, “Jewish Religious Thought, the Holocaust, and Darwinism: A Comparison of Hans Jonas and Mordecai 
Kaplan,” Aleph 13.2 (2013): 311-348. 
50  Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931). 
51 “We must be careful not to reduce God to the ethical or the communal.” “Soterics,” 241, quoted in Scult, 
Radical American Judaism, 138. 
52 Kaplan, journal entry 23 November 1955 , quoted in Scult, Radical American Judaism, 144. 
53 Ibid. 




self.”54 But in the continuation of this passage, Kaplan seems to admit that the divinity of 
the whole is as illusory as the self is; a necessary fiction which we pursue for pragmatic 
benefits.55  
If belief in God does not add anything to the world but is just a way of ordering the 
existing information, what kind of statement does this make it? It describes the meta-
physical, trans-factual; it describes the context of reality taken as a whole and talks over, 
rather than of, the physical.56 And this, for both Wittgenstein and Kaplan, is the result of 
the anti-reductionist tendency which flows through their thought. Which is to say, the 
reality of human experience should not be reduced to anything else; it is not mere 
representation of another historical or spiritual reality. But there is something more than 
this, because both still believe strongly in a form of transcendence. Kaplan writes, “The 
moment God is merely identified with the world and conceived as being immanent but not 
transcendent, His Divinity is denied and He is dissolved into the world. This is the atheism 
and pantheism which religion so vigorously contends against.”57 
This is to say that there is something objective in terms of the processes in the cosmos 
which correlates with what we think of as God, while God as an object does not exist in the 
world. 58  And yet, in being identified with the cosmos, “God” is still in some sense 
transcendent of it; the divine is not reducible to matter, but still must depend on human 
beings in order to realise it by effecting that potential in themselves. The connection of the 
“dots” as divinity is possible, and this possibility is expressed through human subjectivity; 
something which then generates the metaphysical, and this is the ability to create a new 
unity from diverse elements, in the form of a meaningful pattern. So, while there is no 
physically existing entity “God” in the objective cosmos (just as there is no physically real I, 
only the processes that we conceive as constituting selves), human beings through their 
conscious action can identify something we call divine through the structure we perceive.59 
                                                 
54 Kaplan, journal entry 19 March 1943 , quoted in Scult, Radical American Judaism, 145. 
55 “Intellectually I cannot posit the existence of a self, for the little I know of psychology tells me that the self is an 
illusion. Yet if I were to deny the reality of the existence of self as a center of initiative I would cut the ground from 
under the element of responsibility, without which human life is inconceivable. The same holds true of otherhood 
with its element of loyalty and of godhood with its element of piety.” Kaplan, journal entry, 19 March 1943, quoted 
in Scult, Radical American Judaism, 110.  
56 The metaphysical is in one sense outside and in one sense ever-present within (because there is no outside; it is 
rather in the ordering of the facts, or we might say it subsists as the relationship between the objects. Wittgenstein 
was very clear that there is nothing but the facts: even logical operators do not exist, but are an expression of the 
relation in which objects are located.) 
57 Kaplan, note, 30 March 1913, Communings, 62. 
58 “That factor [self-consciousness] gives to man the consciousness of his own unity as a person. Through the unity 
of his person he becomes intuitively aware of that phase of reality with which he has gropingly and blunderingly 
tried to reckon in his various religions.” Mordecai M. Kaplan, Judaism as a Civilization: Toward a Reconstruction of 
American-Jewish Life (Skokie: Varda Books, 2001), 315. And so while “There is only one universe within which both 
man and God exist. The so-called laws of nature represent the manner of God’s immanent functioning. The element 
of creativity, which is not accounted for by the so-called laws of nature, and which points to the organic character of 
the universe or its life as a whole, gives us a clue to God’s transcendent functioning. God is not an identifiable being 
who stands outside the universe. God is the life of the universe, immanent insofar as each part acts upon every 
other, and transcendent insofar as the whole acts upon each part” (ibid., 316). God is expressed within this universe 
but in his unity transcends it. So, for “those who cannot accept the orthodox view of religion […] to find a place for 
the God-idea within the field of natural experience […] They resolve the conflict between religion and science” by 
allowing religion reference “not to an aspect of reality which exists entirely outside the order identified as nature, 
but to an aspect of reality which is not taken into account in what is ordinarily called a naturalistic approach” (ibid., 
316). 
59 “I am not troubled in the least by the fact that God is not an identifiable being. For that matter neither is my 
Ego an identifiable being.” (Kaplan, note, 15 January 1931, Communings, 431); “The thinking, representing, subject 
does not exist.” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §5.631) “There really is just one world soul, which in particular I call my 
soul, and as which alone I grasp what I call the souls of others.” (Wittgenstein, note 13 May 1915, Notebooks, 49). 




So for Kaplan religion is not a dualistic means of subsuming the material under the 
spiritual but a means of realising, or bringing-out, of the spiritual from the material. What 
we call the spiritual is not prior or superior to the physical, but is the elements of life which 
are most transcendent in their value, and only produced when we are set free from our 
base desires and animalistic drives. Religion for Kaplan provides a cohesive system of 
motivation which allows humanity to achieve their potential and better themselves and 
their world. By justifying the integrity of the individual, we create a freedom and 
responsibility which is impossible if the individual is understood as the sum of biological 
drives; and by integrating the community, we create a structure which promotes the 
benefit of all. This anti-reductionist picture is apparent in Wittgenstein when he continues 
to use the word “I” despite denying its existence, and reminds us that interpretation is far 





Having examined the thought of Kaplan and Wittgenstein side by side, I have argued that 
there is a significant similarity in their accounts of a philosophy guided by the phenomenal 
actualities of human life and consciousness, in particular regard to how this should 
influence our understanding and practice of religion. While the strict immanence of 
meaning prompts a censure of traditional metaphysics most clearly for Wittgenstein (but 
also for Kaplan), I have shown that there is still a remnant of metaphysics found most 
clearly in Wittgenstein’s conception of the transcendental self as still nothing but an 
aggregate of the material forms which constitute it – and this is one which correlates 
closely with Kaplan’s depiction of God as fundamentally transcendent while yet existing 
wholly immanently in the material structure of the cosmos. Finally and crucially for both, 
it is only in the realm of human consciousness that the immanent can give way to the 







Kaplan, Mordecai M. The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1994. Originally published in 1937.  
———. The Future of the American Jew. New York: Macmillan, 1948. 
———. Questions Jews Ask: Reconstructionist Answers. New York: The Reconstructionist Press, 
1956. 
———. Judaism as a Civilization: Toward a Reconstruction of American-Jewish Life. Skokie: 
Varda Books, 2001. Originally published in 1981. 
———. Communings of the Spirit: The Journals of Mordecai M. Kaplan Volume I, 1913-1934. 
Edited by Mel Scult. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by Pears & McGuinness. 
London: Routledge, 1974. Originally published in 1922. 




———. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. New edition. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1968. Originally published in 1953. 
———. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Edited by G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and 
G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956. 
———. Notebooks 1914-16. Edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1961. 
———. “A Lecture on Ethics (1930)” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 3-12. 
———. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief. Edited by 
Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967. 
———. Zettel. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Translated by G.E.M. 
Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967. 
———. On Certainty. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Translated by 
Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975. 
———. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough. Translated by A.C. Miles and R. Rhees. 
Herefordshire: Brynmill, 1979. 
———. Culture and Value. Translated by Peter Winch. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980. 
———. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
———. Philosophical Grammar. Edited by Rush Rhees. Translated by Anthony Kenny. 





Breslauer, S. Daniel. Mordecai Kaplan’s Thought in a Postmodern Age. Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 
1994. 
Chatterjee, Ranjit. Wittgenstein and Judaism: A Triumph of Concealment. New York: Peter 
Lang, 2005. 
Clack, Brian R. Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999. 
Husserl, Edmund. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by W.R. 
Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1931. 
Keightley, Alan. Wittgenstein, Grammar and God. London: Epworth Press, 1976. 
Kerr, Fergus. Theology After Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 
Labron, Tim. Wittgenstein and Theology. London: T&T Clark, 2009. 
Langton, Daniel R. “Jewish Religious Thought, the Holocaust, and Darwinism: A 
Comparison of Hans Jonas and Mordecai Kaplan.” Aleph 13.2 (2013): 311-348. 
Malcolm, Norman. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Edited by Peter Winch. New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1995. 
McCutcheon, Felicity. Religion Within the Limits of Language Alone. London: Ashgate, 2001. 
Scult, Mel. The Radical American Judaism of Mordecai M. Kaplan. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press: 2013. 
Stokhof, Martin. World and Life as One. Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein’s Early Thought. 
Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
Willson, Mary F., and Christopher J. Whelan. “The Evolution of Fruit Color in Fleshy-
Fruited Plants.” The American Naturalist 136.6 (1990): 790-809. 
